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Like tobacco, alcohol is responsible for
approximately 4% of the global burden of
disease [1]. A range of policy options have
developed in response to growing concerns
about the scale of the problems caused by
alcohol. In the international research
literature there is broad consensus that
measures to raise the price of alcohol and
control its availability, along with restric-
tions on marketing activities, are the most
effective measures [2–5]. These whole-
population approaches involve reducing
aggregate consumption at the population
level. Conversely, there is little evidence
for the effectiveness of some widely used
approaches such as school-based educa-
tion [5].
Alcohol industry actors, defined as all
those involved with the production, sup-
ply, or sale of alcohol [6], do not have
identical commercial interests and policy
preferences [7]. They have consistently
opposed whole-population approaches,
however, favouring instead targeted inter-
ventions that focus on a supposedly
problematic minority of drinkers and
emphasising the role of individual respon-
sibility [8,9]. Industry actors have been
strongly criticised for producing incom-
plete and distorted views of the evidence
[10,11] and influencing research funding
and publications in biased ways [11].
These tactics mirror those of the tobacco
industry [12], to which some producer
organisations are closely related [13].
Unlike the tobacco industry, which has
been excluded from direct influence in
policy making in many countries, alcohol
industry actors continue to exercise strong
influence on alcohol policies across the
world. For example, they have been
implicated in the actual drafting of policy
documents in low-income countries [14],
and can lead public education in high-
income countries [15,16]. This discrepan-
cy between the tobacco and alcohol
industries has become more noteworthy
as evidence on alcohol industry practices
accumulates [17].
Case Study
We examine formal submissions to the
Scottish Government’s 2008 consultation
on ‘‘Changing Scotland’s relationship with
alcohol’’ [18]. This was the first govern-
mental publication within the UK to
adopt a whole population approach to
alcohol policy, including measures to
introduce minimum unit pricing (MUP;
Text S1). MUP was championed by
public health campaigners including the
British Medical Association as an effec-
tive approach to tackling unacceptably
high levels of alcohol problems, in line
with the most recent WHO sponsored
review of the policy options [5]. The
election of a Scottish National Party
(SNP) minority government in 2007
meant that for the first time since the
establishment of the devolved Scottish
Parliament in 1999, the Scottish Gov-
ernment was not formed by the main
UK-wide political parties. The willing-
ness of the SNP administration to
explore innovative policy approaches
and to engage with public health stake-
holders created the conditions in which
legislation introducing MUP was later
passed [19]. It was subsequently accept-
ed by the UK Government for England
and Wales [20].
We retrieved 27 separate submissions
by industry actors made during the public
consultation process from the Scottish
Government’s website ([21]; a separate
bibliography is presented in Text S2). We
extracted and categorized the main evi-
dential claims made and evaluated these
claims against the most authoritative and
up-to-date international review of the
effectiveness of alcohol policy measures
by Babor and colleagues [5]. We identify
four main methods used by industry actors
in linking evidence to policy, which are
presented here according to our evalua-
tion of their significance, defined primarily
in terms of frequency and prominence
across the documents as a whole. It is not
being suggested that each method was
used in every submission. In the text and
boxes that follow, we provide illustrative
examples, and interested readers are
encouraged to access individual submis-
sions directly, via the links provided in
Text S2.
The Policy Forum allows health policy makers
around the world to discuss challenges and
opportunities for improving health care in their
societies.
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Summary of the Industry
Approach
The views articulated on the nature of
the alcohol problem facing Scottish society
and appropriate policy responses are con-
sistent across submissions. This position is
encapsulated in the Executive Summary
produced by the Wine and Spirit Trade
Association (WSTA) [22]. The WSTA
claims to share the goal of the Scottish
Government in reducing alcohol-related
harm and seeks to work in partnership in
developing an evidence-based approach to
policy which can command high levels of
public support. It is necessary, they argue,
‘‘to tackle the minority with alcohol
problems – the drinkers rather than the
drink’’ and ‘‘policies which punish all
drinkers for the misconduct of a few’’
would be unfair [22].
Commitments to the use of evidence in
policy making are often articulated. For
example, the Portman Group (PG; an
industry-wide social aspects and public
relations organisation [11]) states that ‘‘the
Scottish Government has both a duty and
a right to help protect society against the
adverse consequences of alcohol misuse,
provided that it does this on the basis of
the best available evidence and uses policy
measures that are based as far as possible,
on broad consensus within society [para-
graph 2.6]…We believe in evidence-based
policy making. If the evidence base is
lacking, research should be undertaken
rather than policy be introduced on a
hunch’’ (4.11 in [23]).
Misrepresentation of Strong
Evidence
Industry submissions were frequently
hostile to the whole-population approach
advocated by the Scottish Government as
well as to many, but not all, of the specific
proposals made. Many submissions were
critical of the evidence base underpinning
the proposals, and based their opposition,
at least in part, on evidential rather than
on commercial grounds (see Box 1). These
statements imply some evaluation of
evidence, which is not presented in any
of the submissions. Only in one instance
was this omission declared: ‘‘We have not
sought to carry out a detailed analysis of
the evidence base referred to in the
strategy in our response but we would
observe that it is very selective’’ (WSTA
page 8 in [22]). Industry actors thus accuse
policy makers of possessing weak evi-
dence for their policy proposals and
selectivity in the presentation of evi-
dence, though they neither evaluate the
evidence themselves nor make use of
evaluations by others.
According to the PG [23], ‘‘There is a
raft of contradictory evidence of the
influence of price and promotions on
harm. In the absence of strong evidence,
it seems imprudent to tackle alcohol
misuse by acting against price and pro-
motions’’ [paragraph 4.13]. No details of
any contradictory evidence are provided
here or in any of the other industry
submissions and this statement conflicts
with what is known in the scientific
literature [5]. PG cite a seminal text
elaborating the nature of the whole
population approach [24], in support of
their statement that this approach has
been ‘‘widely discredited’’ [paragraph 4.6,
see also Box 1]. Approximately half the
submissions (n = 14) do not provide any
references and all references provided in
the other 13 submissions are provided in
Text S3 [21].
There are repeated claims that adver-
tising encourages only brand switching
and does not lead to greater consumption,
despite evidence to the contrary. The
review of relevant research by Babor and
colleagues indicates that marketing suc-
cessfully recruits young people to drinking
earlier than would be the case otherwise
and increases consumption among existing
drinkers [5]. According to the Scottish
Beer and Pub Association (SBPA) [25];
‘‘the overwhelming consensus of academic
studies in this area concludes that it does
not drive overall increases in category
consumption in the total population’’
[page 6]. No references are provided.
SAB-Miller [26] state that ‘‘There is, to
our knowledge, no conclusive evidence
that advertising causes underage drinking
or alcohol abuse. There is evidence,
however, that advertising bans or censor-
ship have been ineffective’’ [paragraph
39]. To support this claim, an incomplete
citation is provided to a small study of the
effect of advertising on 166 fifth and eighth
grade schoolchildren’s alcohol expectan-
cies ([27]; see also Text S3). Similarly, the
large literature demonstrating the limited
impact of education – leading Babor and
colleagues to conclude that ‘‘education
alone is too weak a strategy to counteract
other forces that pervade the environ-
ment’’ [5] – is misrepresented. According
to the WSTA [22], ‘‘Many commentators
have attacked education as being ineffec-
tive in changing drinking behaviour. In
fact there has been very little research in
the area’’ [page 32].
Promotion of Weak Evidence
Whilst industry actors misrepresent the
international evidence [5] used by the
Scottish Government, they draw on far
weaker sources for their own positions.
Their emphasis on public support makes
opinion polls a key form of evidence. The
SBPA [25], Morrisons [28], and ASDA
[29] commissioned opinion polls them-
selves. ASDA [29] presents full results of a
survey of 10,109 customers in the form of
a tabulation of responses to four questions
[page 3]. Morrisons [28] provides data on
alcohol consumption at home, having
reduced by 31% whilst consumption in
other locations has increased by 14% in
the 3-year period 2005–2008 (paragraph
5.3, page 6 in [28]). ASDA [29] similarly
present their own market research which
appears to show that under-age drinkers
are half as likely to try to obtain alcohol
from a large supermarket (39%) as they
would from their parents (86%), an off-
licence (78%) or a small convenience store
(92%) (page 18 in [29]). Sophisticated
internal industry data is not provided,
though ASDA [29] and Sainsbury’s [30]
Summary Points
N We examine how research evidence is used in alcohol industry submissions
made to a Scottish Government consultation in 2008 to advocate policies in line
with their commercial interests.
N Industry actors consistently oppose the approaches found in research to be
most likely to be effective at a population level without actually engaging with
the research literature in any depth.
N Strong evidence is misrepresented and weak evidence is promoted. Unsub-
stantiated claims are made about the adverse effects of unfavoured policy
proposals and advocacy of policies favoured by industry is not supported by
the presentation of evidence.
N The potential for corporations with vested interests to interfere with the
evaluation of scientific evidence by policy makers needs to be restricted for
effective policies to be designed.
N Studies of the nature of alcohol industry and other corporate influences on public
policies can be informed by work already conducted on the tobacco industry.
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do both offer to share data with govern-
ment.
Market research is also presented as
intervention evaluation evidence. The
outcome data in these reports are by their
nature unable to provide evidence of
changes in behaviour or reducing harms,
as is implied. For example, referring to one
of their campaigns, Diageo [31] suggest
‘‘Evaluation has shown the advertising to
have a positive impact: more than 60% of
those surveyed by the media evaluation
agency Millward Brown said they were
more likely to consider drinking responsi-
bly following the adverts’’ [page 9].
Further claims are made about the
effectiveness of industry initiatives. For
example, Diageo [31] refer to a ‘‘successful
trial’’ of a student unit awareness campaign
in Glasgow, without providing any details
of study design or criteria for success, and
go on to cite data on the numbers later
reached by this campaign as evidence of
impact, rather than actual impact on
behaviour [page 9]. Box 2 provides an
example of a heavily promoted but weak
intervention evaluation study [32]. Inter-
estingly, the industry funded and extensive-
ly criticised International Centre for Alco-
hol Policies (ICAP) [10], a prolific producer
of research reports, is only referred to by
Pernod-Ricard and Diageo here.
Making Unsubstantiated Claims
about the Adverse Effects of Policy
Proposals
The submission documents contain a
number of unsubstantiated claims about
adverse, unintended consequences of the
proposals. These claims are frequently
repeated and are by their nature difficult
to evaluate. Box 3 provides illustrations of
the types of claims made. No evidential
support for these claims is provided.
Promoting Alternatives without
Evidence
Industry actors present targeted harm
reduction measures as the preferred alter-
native to the whole population approach.
The latter is presented as being too
simplistic and blunt an instrument. This
is a false dichotomy, as these approaches
are complementary and the actual evi-
dence in favour of some targeted measures
[5] is not presented. A sample of industry
policy preferences is provided in Box 4.
The submissions do not offer any evidence
for this policy mix, and the underlying
commercial interests of policy preferences
[7] and conflicts of interests are consis-
tently unacknowledged. Indeed, some
industry actors claim their marketing
activities contribute to harm reduction
when they are directed towards increased
sales and thus greater consumption. For
example, Diageo [31] states that it ‘‘uses
brand sponsorships to raise awareness of
responsible drinking, including Guinness’s
sponsorship of the Rugby Premiership’’
[page 10].
Discussion
The policy preferences of industry
actors, with the interesting exception of
greater law enforcement, are for policies
such as industry self-regulation, public
information, and education, which are
the least likely to be effective [5]. Alcohol
industry actors have been criticised previ-
ously for providing incomplete and dis-
torted views of evidence [10,11]. In this
case study we demonstrate that industry
actors ignored, misrepresented, and oth-
erwise sought to undermine the content of
the international evidence base on effec-
tive policies in order to influence policy.
These tactics mean evidence-based policy-
making is more difficult to achieve where
industry actors are involved, in part by
posing dilemmas for the research commu-
nity about whether and in what circum-
stances to work with industry actors
[33,34].
There are few studies of alcohol indus-
try documents in the public domain, with
Box 1. Criticisms of the Evidence Underpinning the Scottish
Government’s Proposals
Diageo [31]: ‘‘We think that the discussion paper lacks an overall framework for
reducing alcohol-related harm and that many of the individual proposals are ill
thought-out, are based on incomplete, selective and in some cases entirely absent
evidence, and that they are likely not only to be ineffective in tackling minority
alcohol misuse, but would also create unintended negative consequences’’ [page
4]…Diageo is concerned that the paper currently lacks evidence, or presents policy
proposals based on evidence that is inadequate or patchy’’ [page 8].
Portman Group [23]: ‘‘Population-wide control policies, including restrictions on
availability and price, are likely to be ineffective…[paragraph 4.5] Attempting to
tackle problems through reducing per capita consumption (e.g. through taxation or
restrictions on availability) is untargeted, unfair and likely to be ineffective. Indeed
such an approach has been widely discredited in research studies’’ [paragraph 4.6].
SAB-Miller [26]: ‘‘It is predicated on the improbable assumption that raising the
price of alcohol will make those who misuse alcohol behave differently’’
[paragraph 22].
Sainsbury’s [30]: ‘‘We are concerned that the current proposals as they stand lack
a strong evidence base and will result in a number of unintended consequences’’
[page 2].
Scotch Whisky Association [51]: ‘‘The consultation document fails to set out any
firm evidence base on the relative merits and effectiveness of each of the
measures being consulted to reduce alcohol misuse’’ [paragraph 2.9].
Scottish Beer and Pub Association [25]: ‘‘Where figures for the scale of the
problem can only be described as ‘‘estimates’’ and are not ‘‘robust’’ we should be
careful to place the appropriate level of emphasis on them…in respect of a
number of pieces of research produced by the Scottish Government in the run up
to the publication of its discussion paper we must question the basis on which
some of this research has been produced’’ [page 12].
Tesco [52]: ‘‘The consultation makes many claims regarding the impact of price on
consumption. Yet there is little in the way of evidence’’ [page 8].
Wine & Spirit Trade Association [22]: ‘‘The strategy is based on untested
assumptions and a weak evidence base. There is no evidence that controlling
access to alcohol across the board is the key to reducing consumption and
alcohol-related harm and that reducing overall consumption will necessarily
reduce harmful drinking’’ [page 2].
WM Morrison [28]: ‘‘Sadly, the actions proposed in the discussion paper do not
follow from the evidence presented. Nor is there any evidence provided to back
the assumption that by reducing overall consumption a reduction in harmful
drinking will automatically follow’’ [paragraph 4.2].
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the exception of investigation of ICAP
[10]. Wilkinson [35] examined five sub-
missions to an Australian public consul-
tation on new draft guidelines on low-risk
drinking that were similarly critical of the
research evidence. Miller and colleagues
[36] analysed nine submissions concern-
ing the industry-funded Drinkwise in a
different Australian public consultation.
In these cases, industry actors also made
similar attempts to foster doubt about
strong evidence and promote weak
evidence, whilst appearing to be demon-
strating corporate social responsibility
[36]. Munro has examined a campaign
against a tax increase on alcopops by the
Distilled Spirits Industry Council of
Australia, in which rhetorical commit-
ments to the use of evidence for policy
and selective release of industry data
were also identified [37]. A crucial
limitation of studies of documents de-
signed for the public domain is that they
tell us little about the less-visible means
of industry influences on policy, nor
about the success of these efforts [38].
We have used interviews with industry
and other policy actors elsewhere to
attempt to rectify this deficit [9], and
these have begun to yield valuable
insights into the role of lobbying in
policy making in England and Scotland
[19,39].
Investigations of the strategies of
alcohol industry actors may benefit from
comparisons with other industries, and
particularly with the tobacco industry.
Access to internal tobacco industry
documents offers researchers extensive
knowledge of the political goals, strate-
gies, and tactics of transnational tobacco
companies [40–42]. Bero [43] provides a
useful summary of the tactics used by
tobacco companies in relation to evi-
dence about the harms caused by tobac-
co. These include attempts to deceive the
public and policy makers by hiding
information held by companies and
claiming that advertising and marketing
are aimed only at persuading existing
smokers to switch brands rather than also
attracting new users, as claimed here.
In addition to co-ownership of alcohol
and tobacco corporations (such as Miller
and Phillip Morris [13,44]), other possi-
ble means of sharing corporate experi-
ences and tactics across industries in-
clude movements of senior personnel
between industries and use of the same
public relations firms. Bero [43] de-
scribes how tobacco industry lawyers
edited scientific papers written by indus-
Box 2. A Model Intervention and Its Evaluation
A community partnership in the small market town of St.Neots in Cambridgeshire was
widely cited as a model initiative, for example being described as successful or
effective by three of the four main supermarkets. The WSTA provided a detailed
account of the initiative and evaluation data provided by the local police and trading
standards officers. The project ‘‘aimed to improve recognition amongst enforcement
authorities and the wider community that retailers are in fact often the victims of
attempted under-age purchasing and should be seen as the front line of enforcement
rather than the cause of the problem’’ [WSTA [22] pages 34-7]; see also Tesco [52]
pages 4–6]. A 94% decrease in under-age people found in possession of alcohol
described a change from 32 offences over the first nine enforcement operations to 1
offence in the 10th and 2 in the 11th operation (details of timing not provided). Pre–
post comparison of 335 antisocial behaviour incidents in August to 196 in February
yielded an overall reduction in antisocial behaviour incidents described as 42%. A
decrease in alcohol-related litter at the skate park from 21 bottles and 86 cans on the
first weekend of the project to 1 bottle and 8 cans on the final weekend produced a
92% decrease (the time periods differ from previously cited outcome measure).
The attention-grabbing percentage decreases are provided as evidence of benefits,
and cited elsewhere, for example by SAB-Miller [paragraph 18 in [26]] without any
alternative explanations for them being considered. All quantitative data produced in
this evaluation study have been cited here and further information on this award
winning and ‘‘ground breaking’’ [Tesco [52] page 6] project is available for inspection
in the Retail of Alcohol Standards Group/WSTA publication on the county council
website [32]. This report lacks any presentation of evaluation studymethods and thus
consideration of the possibility of biases. Claims of success involving quantitative
data are made entirely on the basis of the before–after counts presented here, along
with accounts of reductions in various problems without any quantification of them
including a newspaper report that the local Member of Parliament receives fewer
complaints about antisocial behaviour in one area. Other presentations of outcomes
are that public perceptions and community confidence have been improved,
without any information provided on how these data have been collected.
Box 3. Claimed Adverse Effects of Policy Proposals
ASDA [29]: ‘‘Believe that minimum pricing and a promotions ban will create
incentives for the black market and criminals and illegal door to door sales’’ [page 10].
Sainsbury’s [30]: Describe possible routes for cross-border shopping in England
and Northern Ireland [paragraph 2.3].
Portman Group [23]: ‘‘Adopting a population-wide approach may not only fail to
reduce misuse but it could perversely contribute to an increase in unhealthy
drinking patterns and unregulated trading with the associated criminal activities
[paragraph 4.8]…[increasing off-licence purchase age] could foster a feeling of
resentment among young adults. It could also increase the appeal of alcohol to
young people by creating a ‘mystique’ surrounding alcohol. Turning alcohol into
a ‘forbidden fruit’ will only enhance its appeal to young adults looking to find
ways of escaping the problems in their lives’’ [paragraph 5.28].
SBPA [25]: ‘‘May undermine the targeted initiatives, which may yield the highest
results [sic] amongst the groups most heavily misusing alcohol’’ [page 6].
WSTA [22]: ‘‘We believe that it [increasing price] will create seriousmarket distortions
within the UKmarket…Additionally, this proposal risks increasing the sale of alcohol
via unregulated ‘‘white van’’ type sales where the danger of sales to young people is
high. We already see operators selling illicit alcohol and tobacco on to the poorer
estates and we would expect this to become more prevalent’’ [page 19].
SAB-Miller [26]: ‘‘In countries where a minimum price has been introduced there
have been unintended negative effects. By increasing the price of alcohol
according to unit content the consequence is a shift from lower strength alcohol
to those with higher alcohol content such as wines and spirits. This is especially
problematic to harmful drinkers who are less responsive to changes in price and
will continue to drink despite increased costs’’ [paragraph 26].
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try-funded scientists, including deleting
acknowledgements of industry sponsor-
ship [43]. Whether the alcohol industry
may have subverted the evidence base in
similar ways, and if so to what extent, is
unknown [11].
The influence of corporate vested
interests on the technical and scientific
issues evaluated by policy makers now
generates concern in areas including the
environment, energy, biotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, and defence [45]. An
important tactic in contemporary corpo-
rate lobbying, pioneered by the tobacco
industry, is the construction of doubt
about the content of scientific evidence
[43,46,47], and this may underlie the
approach taken in these submissions.
This has been shown to be influential
on policy makers, particularly in the
U.S., across a wide range of health and
environmental concerns, as well on
public opinion [46,48]. Corporate influ-
ences are also discernible on the framing
of issues for investigation by alcohol
researchers [49], providing many targets
for further study.
The preceding discussion raises ques-
tions of what is, and should be, the role of
industry actors within the policy process
[33,34]. In Westminster, alcohol industry
actors have cultivated long-term relation-
ships with the main political parties [39]
and an apparent consensus amongst these
parties that they should have a wide-
ranging role in alcohol policies [16,20].
However, no clear boundaries have been
established which facilitate the legitimate
representation of commercial interests
whilst protecting against conflicts of inter-
est in evaluation of evidence. Despite the
commitment to MUP, the most recently
published Alcohol Strategy in England
defines the alcohol problem in a way
promoted by industry actors and reinforc-
es the previous government’s commitment
to placing partnership with industry at the
heart of policy making [16,20,33].
Policy making is not a purely rational
process, informed only by evidence. It is
by definition political and thus subject to a
wide range of influences, and this com-
plexity warrants dedicated investigations.
However, we suggest that the public
interest is not served by industry actors’
involvement in the interpretation of re-
search evidence. There is no obvious
evidential contribution to be made by the
corporate public relations specialists who
engage with policy makers [50]. Commer-
cial conflicts of interest should be made
explicit and policy makers should treat
industry actors’ interpretation of research
evidence with extreme caution. It is for
public debate whether and to what extent
the health of the population may be
compromised by the commercial interests
of industry, and whether the apparent
economic contributions of the alcohol
industry fully take into account the health
and other social costs their activities incur.
For policy makers, key questions concern
how the pursuit of commercial interests
may conflict with broader public interests
and lead to the marginalisation of scientific
evidence in decision-making.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Complete list of Scottish Gov-
ernment consultation questions (annex h
in [18]).
(DOCX)
Text S2 Twenty-seven alcohol industry
submissions.
(DOCX)
Text S3 All sources cited in industry
documents.
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Kelley Lee and Kypros
Kypri for comments on an earlier draft of this
paper, and to Sarah Cook for assistance with
the manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: JM.
Performed the experiments: JM BH. Analyzed
the data: JM BH. Contributed reagents/mate-
rials/analysis tools: JM BH CH. Wrote the first
draft of the manuscript: JM. Contributed to the
writing of the manuscript: JM BH CH. ICMJE
criteria for authorship read and met: JM BH
CH. Agree with manuscript results and conclu-
sions: JM BH CH.
References
1. Rehm J, Mathers C, Popova S, Thavornchar-
oensap M, Teerawattananon Y, et al. (2009)
Global burden of disease and injury and
economic cost attributable to alcohol use and
alcohol-use disorders. Lancet 373: 2223–
2233.
2. Bruun K (1975) Alcohol Control Policies in
Public Health Perspective. Helsinki: Finnish
Foundation for Alcohol Studies.
Box 4. Policy Preferences
ASDA [29]: ‘‘We would urge policy-makers to concentrate on a combination of
education, information and working with the on and off-trade to test out a wider
range of voluntary measures to combat irresponsible drinking. Also, there is an urgent
need to ensure that there is maximum enforcement of existing legislation’’ [page 7].
Diageo [31]: We strongly believe that a system of co-regulation is the most
appropriate and effective approach to tackling alcohol misuse. Under co-
regulation, the Government and the alcohol industry draw up standards together,
which are strictly monitored and enforced, both within the industry and by
Government through existing laws and regulations. But we also believe that
individuals must take responsibility for their own actions, a principle which is
unfortunately largely lacking in the discussion paper’’ [page 3].
Portman Group [23]: ‘‘An effective alcohol harm reduction strategy should cover a
broad policy mix which comprises (a) effective enforcement of laws governing
the sale and consumption; (b) self-regulation by those who produce, advertise
and sell alcohol, and (c) encouragement of individuals to take personal
responsibility for drinking choices’’ [paragraph 4.14].
SAB-Miller [26]: ‘‘There are less intrusive means by which the Scottish government
can achieve its objectives than by imposing broad, population-based policies.
These less intrusive means include education efforts on the laws against
underage drinking, disorderly conduct, and sales to intoxicated or underage
people, coupled with consistent and rigorous enforcement of these existing laws.
Education and enforcement should be the cornerstone of Scotland’s strategy to
tackle alcohol misuse’’ [paragraphs 11 and 12].
Tesco [52]: ‘‘We consider that the Scottish Government’s laudable objectives can
best be achieved through a triple strategy of stricter enforcement of existing law,
better education and effective partnership between those who sell alcohol,
government, local authorities and enforcement authorities. Improved information
and education about alcohol will help individuals make better decisions about
their lifestyle choices and their alcohol consumption’’ [page 1].
PLOS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 5 April 2013 | Volume 10 | Issue 4 | e1001431
3. Edwards G, Anderson P, Babor TF, Casswell S,
Ferrence R, et al. (1994) Alcohol policy and the
public good. Oxford: Oxford Medical Publications.
4. Babor T, Caetano R, Casswell S, et al. (2003) No
ordinary commodity: Alcohol and public policy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Babor T, Caetano R, Casswell S, et al. (2010)
Alcohol, no ordinary commodity: research &
public policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Jernigan DH (2009) The global alcohol industry:
An overview. Addiction 104 Suppl 1: 6–12.
7. Holden C, Hawkins B, McCambridge J (2012)
Cleavages and co-operation in the UK alcohol
industry: a qualitative study. BMC Public Health 12.
8. Room R (2005) Drinking patterns as an ideology.
Addiction 100: 1803–1804.
9. Hawkins B, Holden C, McCambridge J (2012)
Alcohol industry influence on UK alcohol
policy: a new research agenda for public
health. Critical Public Health 22: 297–
305.
10. Jernigan DH (2012) Global alcohol producers,
science, and policy: the case of the international
center for alcohol policies. Am J Public Health
102: 80–89.
11. Babor TF (2009) Alcohol research and the
alcoholic beverage industry: issues, concerns and
conflicts of interest. Addiction 104 Suppl 1: 34–
47.
12. Babor TF (2000) Partnership, profits and public
health. Addiction 95: 193–195.
13. Bond L, Daube M, Chikritzhs T (2010) Selling
addictions: Similarities in approaches between big
tobacco and big booze. Australasian Medical
Journal 3: 325–332.
14. Bakke O, Endal D (2010) Vested interests in
addiction research and policy alcohol policies out
of context: drinks industry supplanting govern-
ment role in alcohol policies in sub-Saharan
Africa. Addiction 105: 22–28.
15. Room R (2004) Disabling the public interest:
alcohol strategies and policies for England.
Addiction 99: 1083–1089.
16. Cabinet Office Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit
(2004) Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for
England, March 2004. London: Prime Minister’s
Strategy Unit.
17. Barbour V, Clark J, Jones S, Norton M, Veitch E
(2011) Let’s be straight up about the alcohol
industry. PLoS Med 8: e1001041.
18. Scottish Government (2008) Changing Scotland’s
relationship with alcohol: A discussion paper on
our strategic approach Edinburgh: Scottish Gov-
ernment.
19. Holden C, Hawkins B (2012) ‘Whisky gloss’: The
alcohol industry, devolution and policy commu-
nities in Scotland. Public Policy & Administration
DOI 10.1177/0952076712452290.
20. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2012)
The Government’s Alcohol Strategy. Cm 8336
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/
alcohol-drugs/alcohol/alcohol-strategy?view =
Binary. London: TSO (The Stationery Office)
21. The Scottish Government (2008) Alcohol Misuse
- Consultation Responses (Organisations).
22. The Wine & Spirit Trade Association (2008)
Submission to the Scottish Government Consul-
tation Changing Scotland’s Relationship with
Alcohol: A Discussion Paper on our Strategic
Approach. 4 September 2008.
23. The Portman Group (2008) Changing Scotland’s
Relationship with Alcohol. A Response from The
Portman Group, September 2008.
24. Rose G (1992) The Strategy of preventive
Medicine Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. The Scottish Beer and Pub Association (2008)
The Scottish Beer and Pub Association’s Re-
sponse to the Scottish Government’s Consultation
Paper Changing Scotland’s Relationship with
Alcohol: A Discussion Paper on Our Strategic
Approach, September 2008.
26. SAB-Miller (2008) Changing Scotland’s Relation-
ship with Alcohol: A Discussion Paper on Our
Strategic Approach. A Response by SAB-Miller.
27. Lipsitz A, Brake G, Vincent EJ, Winters M (1993)
Another Round for the Brewers - Television Ads
and Childrens Alcohol Expectancies. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology 23: 439–450.
28. WM Morrison Supermarkets (2008) Changing
Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol. Response
to Discussion Paper.
29. ASDA (2008) Common Ground with Fairness
and Equity. ASDA’s Response to the Scottish
Government’s Consultation Changing Scotland’s
Relationship with Alcohol, 9th September 2008.
30. Sainsbury’s (2008) Sainsbury’s Submission to the
Scottish Government’s Consultation Paper
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol:
A Discussion Paper on Our Strategic Approach,
August 2008.
31. Diageo (2008) Changing Scotland’s Relationship
with Alcohol. Response by Diageo to the Scottish
Government’s Discussion Paper, 3 September
2008.
32. Retail of Alcohol Standards Group/Wine and
Spirit Trade Association/Cambridgeshire County
Council (2008) A new way of tackling public
under-age drinking: Community Alcohol Part-
nerships. Cambridgeshire County Council. Avail-
able: http://www.cambridgeshire.gov.uk/NR/
rdonlyres/3EEB9A78-DAE0-4393-AF34-
9CCC7D9983B7/0/Community_Alcohol_
Partnership.pdf
33. McCambridge J (2012) Dealing responsibly with
the alcohol industry in London. Alcohol &
Alcoholism 47: 635–637.
34. Adams PJ, Buetow S, Rossen F (2010) Vested
Interests in Addiction Research and Policy:
Poisonous partnerships: health sector buy-in to
arrangements with government and addictive
consumption industries. Addiction 105: 585–590.
35. Wilkinson C (2012) Responses to risk: Public
submissions on Australian alcohol guidelines for
low-risk drinking. Drug Alcohol Rev 31: 162–
169.
36. Miller PG, de Groot F, McKenzie S, Droste N
(2011) Vested interests in addiction research and
policy. Alcohol industry use of social aspect public
relations organizations against preventative health
measures. Addiction 106: 1560–1567.
37. Munro G (2012) Why the Distilled Spirits
Industry Council of Australia is not a credible
partner for the Australian government in making
alcohol policy. Drug Alcohol Rev 31: 365–369.
38. Room R (2006) Advancing industry interests in
alcohol policy: the double game. Nordic Studies
on Alcohol and Drugs 23: 389–392.
39. Hawkins B, Holden C (2012) ‘Water dripping on
stone’?: Industry lobbying and UK alcohol policy.
Policy & Politics http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/
030557312X655440.
40. Holden C, Lee K (2009) Corporate power and
social policy: The political economy of the
transnational tobacco companies. Global Social
Policy 9: 328–354.
41. Hurt RD, Ebbert JO, Muggli ME, Lockhart NJ,
Robertson CR (2009) Open Doorway to Truth:
Legacy of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial. Mayo
Clinic Proceedings 84: 446–456.
42. Fooks GJ, Gilmore AB, Smith KE, Collin J,
Holden C, et al. (2012) Corporate Social
responsibility and access to policy elites: An
analysis of tobacco industry documents. PLoS
Med 8: e1001076.
43. Bero L (2003) Implications of the tobacco
industry documents for public health and policy.
Annual Review of Public Health 24: 267–288.
44. Daube M (2012) Alcohol and tobacco. Australian
and New Zealand Journal Of Public Health 36:
108–110.
45. Langley C, Parkinson S (2009) Science and the
corporate agenda: The detrimental effects of
commercial influence on science and technology
http://www.sgr.org.uk/: Scientists for Global
Responsibility: Promoting ethical science, design
and technology.
46. Michaels D (2008) Doubt is Their Product: How
Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens Your
Health Oxford: Oxford University Press.
47. Francey N, Chapman S (2000) ‘‘Operation
Berkshire’’: the international tobacco companies’
conspiracy. BMJ 321: 371–374.
48. Stocking SH, Holstein LW (2009) Manufacturing
doubt: journalists’ roles and the construction of
ignorance in a scientific controversy. Public
Understanding of Science 18: 23–42.
49. McCambridge J (2012) A user’s guide to the 2012
Alcohol Strategy for England and Wales: A
commentary on the commentaries. Drugs: edu-
cation, prevention & policy 19: 377–378.
50. Miller D, Harkins C (2010) Corporate strategy,
corporate capture: Food and alcohol industry
lobbying and public health. Critical Social Policy
30: 564–589.
51. The Scotch Whisky Association (2008) Response
to the Scottish Government’s Consultation Paper
Changing Scotland’s Relationship with Alcohol:
A Discussion Paper on Our Strategic Approach.
52. Tesco (2008) Tesco Plc Submission to the Scottish
Government Consultation Changing Scotland’s
Relationship with Alcohol.
PLOS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 6 April 2013 | Volume 10 | Issue 4 | e1001431
